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Abstract 
 
In RFID system a tag is attached to an object which might own by a number of owners during its life time. This 
requires the RFID system to transfer ownership of the tag to its new owner. The ownership transfer has to protect 
privacy of current and new owner. Many ownership tag ownership transfer exists in the literature, however, most 
of them are impractical or insecure to implement on current passive RFID tags. We are proposing a timer based 
ownership transfer protocol for closed loop RFID systems. The proposal in this paper includes two implement 
scenario to cover diverse tags type. The protocol will ensure security and privacy of involved parties in the idle 
circumstances. Our comparison shows that the proposed protocol is more secure and practical than existing similar 
ones.  
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1. Introduction  
Radio frequency Identification (RFID) is a data 
capturing technology which uses radio frequency 
(RF) to identify tags (also known as transponders). It 
is attached to an object such as products or animals 
and communicate wirelessly through reader (also 
known as scanners). The reader uses database server 
for further information about the object such as price, 
expiry date, etc.  
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The major achievement of RFID technology can be 
achieved by offering the ability and possibility for a 
large scale automated data collection wirelessly.  
There are three types of tags: active, semi-active and 
passive. The active tag includes a power source. The 
semi-active has a battery to store energy but requires 
to power on by a reader. The reader generates a radio 
frequency (RF) transmission to power on the passive 
tags which has no power source of its own. The tags 
transmission range and bandwidth will depend on 
many factors such as the type of the tag, tag 
manufacture and design, etc.  
The passive tags are usually low-cost tags, used 
widely for low value products of our everyday life 
which requires moderate security.  To make the 
passive tag more economic, it is very important to be 
able to use the tag more than once which require 
changing its ownership from one owner to another. 
The tag ownership transfer is one of the key 
requirements for global implementation of networked 
RFID systems. 
However many security and privacy threats might 
occur during the tag ownership transfer  such as  relay 
attacks, replay attacks, cloning, spoofing, Denial of 
Service (DoS), etc. These are serious concern for 
secure tag ownership transfer. In the recent years 
many security ownership transfer protocols attempt to 
deal with these threats which are discussed in details 
in section II. Hereby we are presenting a multi 
scenarios ownership transfer protocol based on a 
timer function in a closed loop system which is 
practical and secure. 
 
2. Related Work 
Many researchers worked on mutual authentication 
between tags and readers [3] [4]. However, the secure 
tag ownership transfer concept is newer and received 
less attention until recently when Osaka et al. [6] 
proposed a secure ownership protocol based on hash 
functions. Osaka was followed by other researchers 
who tried to propose improved version of [6] such as 
Wang et al.[7] and Jappinen [8]. However, [6, 7, 8] 
have de-synchronization problem [10]. 
Also Song et al. [9] have proposed an ownership 
protocol which is based on tag identifiers using hash 
chains but it was proven weak against eavesdrop 
attack made by the previous owner during the 
transfer. 
Chen et al. [11] proposed a three phase’s one to one 
tag ownership transfer but the mutual authentication 
was proven weak against replay attack. Lin et al [12] 
also proposed a one to one ownership protocol which 
is weak at DoS and de-synchronization attacks. 
Kapoor et al. [10] proposed a multi-tag and multi-
owner RFID ownership transfer protocol which uses 
a TTP (trusted third party) as a middleware this was 
protocol found to be suffering from DoS attack and 
de-synchronization attack. An attacker can change the 
random number in acknowledgement transmission 
from tag to TTP which will be discarded by TTP as it 
has incorrect value. This situation can potentially be 
used to generate a de-synchronization attack for a 
specific period of time which will lead to DoS attack. 
Doss, R et al. [4] proposed a secure tag ownership 
transfer protocol for closed loop system based on The 
Quadratic Residue property. It is also insecure against 
impersonation attack and DoS attack [3]. 
Finally Ray et al. [3] proposed a secure mobile RFID 
ownership transfer protocol to cover all scenarios 
based on Diffie-Hellman secret Key exchange, 
although the protocol solved the windowing problem, 
however the Diffie- Hellman key exchange protocol 
itself was subject to weaknesses as suggested by Tang 
[5]. The Diffie- Hellman key exchange is vulnerable 
to Man-in-the-middle attack [6] that Ray et al. 
protocol suggests it would prevent. 
 
3. Our Proposed Protocol Details: 
 
In this section, we detail the proposed protocol.  We 
first detail initial setup which is followed by 
illustration and discussion of proposed protocol 
scenarios. For this discussion, we will use symbols 
detailed in Table 1. 
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3.1 Our proposed protocol setup (for all 
scenarios) : 
 
 All tags, readers will have Timing 
Synchronization Function (TYF) [13] called 
timer which uses reader ID (ܴܫܦ) as seed. 
This timer is unique to a specific reader and 
always synchronized between reader ID and 
tag. The timer will be a secret changeable 
value in all transmissions. The change will 
depend on the owner request and protocol’s 
requirement. 
 The scheme will use a keyed hash 
functionܪሺሻ. The tag ID (ܶܫܦ) will be stored 
as ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦሻ in tag where ‘ݐݎ’ is the timer. 
The TID is known to the database server and 
it will storeݐݎ, and ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦሻfor every tag. 
 
Table 1: Symbols and their descriptions 
Symbol Explanations 
ݐݎ,tr1 The Timer 
ܴܶଵ,ܴܶଶ Randomized timer 
ܭ Random number 
H() Keyed Hash function 
ܦܤ1 Current owner’s database server 
ܦܤ2 New owners’ database server 
ܴ1 Current owner’s reader 
ܴ2 New owner’s reader 
ܴܫܦ Reader’s ID 
ܶܫܦ Tad ID or serial of the tag 
ܷܭ Unknown tag 
 
 There will be a verifier reader which verifies 
the activities of readers in its list at each end 
to ensure that unexpected transmission can 
be identified earlier and to prevent relay 
attack as well. 
 The tag will have two modes, the R (read) 
mode which is used for reading the tags 
details and the RW mode (read and write) 
which is used for ownership transfer. 
Initially, all tags will be in the R mode. 
Figure 1 shows a tag with full setup. 
 The ݐݎ will be checked and synchronized 
from time to time in tags by current owner’s 
reader. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Tags setup and modes 
 
 
3.2 Our Proposed Scenario 1 
This scenario has higher computational cost on tag 
compare to scenario 2. It requires less backward 
connection. 
 
I. Mutual Authentication stage: 
 
This stage will start when the tags (which are subject 
to the ownership transfer) will receive a request to set 
them up to the RW mode from the current owner 
reader	ሺܴ1ሻ. The ܴ1 will send ܣ from equation (1) to 
the tag. The ܣ is calculated from equation (1) where 
hashed ܴܫܦ௜ is concatenated with ܴܶଵ. ܴܶଵ is 
calculated from equation (2) where ݐݎ value is 
XORed with random number ܭ. 
ܣ ൌ ܪ௧௥ሺܴܫܦ௜ሻ ∥ ܴܶଵ                                              (1) 
 
ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦ௜ሻ 
ݐݎ, ܪ௧௥ሺܴܫܦ௜ሻ 
 
R Mode (Read only) 
RW Mode (Read & Write) 
 
Tag 
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ܴܶଵ ൌ ݐݎ⨁ܭ                                                            (2) 
 
ܤ ൌ ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦ௜ሻ ⊕ ܭ                                                (3) 
  
Once the tag receive the hashed ܴܫܦ௜ as well asܴܶଵ, 
it verifies current reader’s ID using its pre-store 
value. If the verification returns true then the tags will 
change its mode from R to RW mode.  
ܭ ൌ ܴܶଵ⨁ݐݎ                                                            (4) 
 
The tag then retrieves K from equation (4) and reply 
to current owner reader by sendingܤ. The ܤ is 
calculated in equation (3) where hashed tag ID is 
XORed with ܭ. 
The current owner reader verifies received ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦ௜ሻ  
and ܭ using database server's information. The tag 
can only reply with correctܭ, if it has synchronized 
and correctݐݎ. In case of transmission delay or 
incorrectܭ, the reader discards all transmission. If the 
reader was unable to verify transmission from tag for 
second time it will mark the tag ܷܭ(unknown tag). 
If ܶܫܦ௜  and ܭ is valid then current owner’s database 
server (ܦܤ1) sends ܤ and ܭ to new owner’s database 
server (ܦܤ2) and request for ܴܫܦ௜ାଵ. The ܴ1 then 
writes ܴܫܦ௜ାଵ to tag and ends its transmission. The 
ܦܤ2 will generate ܴܶଶ in equation (5) where random 
numberܭ is XORed with new owner’s timerݐݎଵ. 
 
ܴܶଶ ൌ ݐݎଵ⨁ܭ         (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Details of the protocol scenario 1(2 stages). 
DB1 DB2 
Tag R1 R2  
Generate 
ܴܶଶ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
ܤ, ܭ 
ܴܫܦ௜ାଵ⨁ݐݎ 
ሺܴܫܦ௜ାଵ⨁ݐݎሻ 
C,ܴܶଶ 
D 
E 
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The new owner’s reader ܴ2	will send ܥ and ܴܶଶ to 
the tag. The ܥ is calculated by XORing hashed new 
owner’s RID ( ܪ௧௥ሺܴܫܦ௜ାଵሻ) and ݐݎଵ in equation (6). 
The tag will verify correctness of ܴܫܦ௜ାଵ	using its 
stored values. If RID୧ାଵ send from R2 is valid then 
the tag sends D to the R2 where D is calculated by 
XORing hashed ܶܫܦ௜ and ܭ as shown in equation (7). 
 
C=ܪ௧௥భሺܴܫܦ௜ାଵሻ⊕ ݐݎଵ          (6) 
 
ܦ ൌ	ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦ௜ሻ ⊕ ܭ              (7)                                            
 
Here the new owner’s reader will compare the 
correctness of the transmission from the tag by 
verifying equality ofܦ ൌൌ ܤ. If ܤ ൌൌ ܦ then the 
mutual authentication stage will be successfully 
completed. Otherwise ܦܤ2 will mark the tag as 
ܷܭand send ܦ back to ܦܤ1	for further investigation. 
 
II. Ownership transfer stage: 
After completing the mutual authentication stage, the 
new owner will generate new tag ID TID୧ାଵ.Then it 
sends ܧ to the tag and request to execute write 
operation to change the TID. The ܧ is calculated from 
equation (8) where hashed ܶܫܦ௜ାଵ is XORed with ݐݎଵ.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tag retrieves ܪ௧௥భሺܶܫܦ௜ାଵሻ as it knows ݐݎଵ using 
ܭ value on ܴܶଶ.  
 
ܧ ൌ 	ܪ௧௥భሺܶܫܦ௜ାଵሻ ⊕ ݐݎଵ                                        (8) 
It then replaces its old ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦ௜ሻ with new 
ܪ௧௥భሺܶܫܦ௜ାଵሻ which ends the ownership transfer. At 
this point forward only new owner can read the tag 
usingܶܫܦ௜ାଵ. 
 
3.3 Our Proposed Scenario 2 
In this scenario the new owner DB2 starts the 
ownership transfer protocol when it sends its hashed 
reader ID ሺܴܫܦ௜ାଵሻ to DB1 through the backend 
channel. 
Once the current owner receivesሺܴܫܦ௜ାଵሻ , the tags 
(which are subject to the ownership transfer) will 
receive a request to set them up to the RW mode from 
the current owner reader	ሺܴ1ሻ. The ܴ1 will send A 
Xored with ሺܴܫܦ௜ାଵሻ to the tag. ܣ	is calculated from 
equation (9) where hashed ܴܫܦ௜ is concatenated with 
ܴܶଵ. ܴܶଵ is calculated from equation (10) where ݐݎ 
value is XORed with random number ܭ. (See figure 
no. 3). 
ܣ ൌ ܪ௧௥ሺܴܫܦ௜ሻ ∥ ܴܶଵ                                              (9) 
 
ܴܶଵ ൌ ݐݎ⨁ܭ                                                                      
(10) 
 
ܤ ൌ ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦ௜ሻ ⊕ ܭ                                                          
(11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Details of the proposed protocol Scenario 2. 
DB1
R1
Tag
A⨁ሺܴܫܦ௜ାଵሻ	
ܤ
DB2
R2
Generates 
TR2 ܥ⨁ܴܶ2
ሺܴܫܦ௜ାଵሻ 
ܭ
OK or UK
TR1
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ܴܶଵ ൌ ݐݎ⨁ܭ                                                        (10) 
 
ܤ ൌ ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦ௜ሻ ⊕ ܭ                                            (11) 
 
Once the tag receive the hashed ܴܫܦ௜ as well as	ܴܶଵ, 
it verifies current reader’s ID using its pre-store 
value. If the verification returns true then the tags will 
change its mode from R to RW mode.  
ܭ ൌ ܴܶଵ⨁ݐݎ                                                        (12) 
 
The tag then retrieves K from equation (12), and 
forward to the new owner reader ሺܴܫܦ௜ାଵሻ  by 
sending	ܤ. ܤ Is calculated in equation (11) where 
hashed tag ID is XORed with ܭ. 
 
R1 will sends K to R2 via DB2 through the back end 
channel, here R2 will verify K received from both ܤ 
and DB1 if they were Identical R2 will send 
Confirmation and request TR1 from DB1 In case of 
transmission delay or incorrect	ܭ, the reader discards 
all transmission. If the reader was unable to verify 
transmission from tag for second time it will mark the 
tag ܷܭ(unknown tag). 
Once DB1 receives confirmation (OK) from R2 
through DB2, DB1 will send TR1 to R2 through back 
end channel. 
The ܦܤ2 will generate ܴܶଶ in equation (13) where 
random number ܭ is XORed with new owner’s timer 
ݐݎଵ. 
 
ܴܶଶ ൌ ݐݎଵ⨁ܭ          (13) 
The new owner’s reader ܴ2	will generate new tag ID 
TID୧ାଵ.Then it sends ܥ Xored with TR2 to the tag 
and request to execute write operation to change the 
TID. The  ܥ is calculated from equation (14). Where 
hashed ܶܫܦ௜ାଵ is XORed with ݐݎଵ. The tag retrieves 
ܪ௧௥భሺܶܫܦ௜ାଵሻ as it knows ݐݎଵ using ܭ value on ܴܶଶ.  
 
ܥ ൌ 	ܪ௧௥భሺܶܫܦ௜ାଵሻ ⊕ ݐݎଵ                                       (14) 
It then replaces its old ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦ௜ሻ with new 
ܪ௧௥భሺܶܫܦ௜ାଵሻ which ends the ownership transfer. At 
this point forward only new owner can read the tag 
using	ܶܫܦ௜ାଵ.Then the tag will change its mode back 
to read only (R) after the last transmission. 
 
4. Security Analysis 
 
In both scenarios above we notice that the protocol 
is simple but effective at the same time, since the 
secret key Timer (ݐݎ) changes all the time it will be 
very hard to trace the TID by any malicious reader. 
The captured information by eavesdroppers will be 
useless also because of randomness and changing 
nature of ݐݎ. The protocol will provide the following 
security measures: 
 
 Tag ID anonymity: The tag ID is hashed and 
encrypted with keyed hash ܪ௧௥ሺܶܫܦ௜ሻ, it 
won’t be possible to detect or compromising 
the tag. Also the tag will not reveal 
transmitted data since the communication 
between the tag and readers will have 
random values as we can see in both 
scenarios of the protocol ( see figure 2 and 3 
). In Table 2 we represent our proposed two 
protocol scenarios and their defense against 
the attacks shown compared to the other 
protocols. 
 Forward security: For scenario 1 as shown 
above in equation (8) if the tag has been 
compromised and its current ID has been 
obtained this will not allow the attacker to 
trace any previous communication since the 
value E XORed the hashed ܪ௧௥భሺܶܫܦ௜ାଵሻ 
with tr1 and stored this value in the tag. The 
same thing can be said for Scenario 2 , see 
formula (14). 
 Forward Untractability: In both scenarios 
the old owner cannot compromise the new 
secret key or the new TR since the new 
owner will generate a new secret key TR2 
by XORing the tr1 with the K as shown in 
equation (5) and equation (13) in scenario 1 
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and scenario 2 .So the old owner won’t be 
able to retrieve ݐݎ1which will be the secret 
key for the tag.                                               
 Relay, replay attacks, Man in the middle 
and eavesdropping attacks: In scenario 1 
above, the attacker will be unable to 
impersonate a new owner by recording and 
replaying messages from previous rounds. 
Even if the attacker was recording and 
replaying messages from previous rounds, 
the attacker will be unable to establish a 
communication with the tag as the timer 
changes in every read which leads to change 
the value of ܣ as shown in equation (1) and 
(2).The Same way we can prove that the 
values of A, B, C, D and E won’t be as same 
for the second round.While in scenario 2 we 
can see that the Value of ܣ also depends on 
the timer as shown in equations (9) and (10) 
while the other values are also changeable 
for the next round as they all depend on the 
timer function. So recording and replaying 
previous rounds won’t be successful. This 
will leads us to the conclusion that our 
proposed protocol will reduce the 
eavesdropping attacks to the minimum. Also 
the reader ID’s will always be hashed during 
transmission and concatenated with ܴܶ1 as 
shown in equation (1) and equation (9) or 
XORed with ݐݎ and ݐݎ1 as showen in 
equation (6) for the first scenario. which will 
prevent the MIMT (man-in-the-middle) 
attack from retrieving the reader ID’s to talk 
to the tag. 
 DoS attacks: For both scenarios the tags are 
in their R mode all the time which makes 
them ignores any attempt to write on them 
and will respond only to the transmission 
from the trusted readers (R1). So it won’t be 
possible to overwhelm the tags with 
messages as they will ignore them all as long 
as they did not came from the trusted 
readers. Also blocking the messages won’t 
affect the system as the ݐݎinstalled 
individually at every tag, reader and DB that 
makes them run independently and ignore 
any messages with incorrect value.
 
 
Table 2: Comparison between proposed and a number of existing protocols 
 
Security 
concerns and 
threats 
compared to 
the protocols 
Tag ID 
anonymity  
Forward 
security 
Forward     
untractability 
Relay 
& 
replay 
attacks  
Dos 
attack 
Imprisonment attack 
Our proposed 
protocol 
Scenario 1  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Our proposed 
protocol 
Scenario 2 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Osaka et al.[6] Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Dimitriou Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Song and 
Mitchell[9] 
Yes Yes No Yes No Partially secure 
Kapoor and Yes No No Yes No Yes 
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5. Conclusion 
We have presented two new scenarios protocol with 
an independent changeable timer installed on all three 
components of the RFID system that works as a 
changeable secret key. The proposed protocol is 
immune against many major security threats and 
attacks as shown in the security analysis. These two 
new protocol scenarios used for tag ownership 
transfer in a closed loop system might light the way 
for further studies and development. 
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